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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
GOLDEN SPIKE EQUIPMENT CO.,
A Utah Corporation
Plaintiff-Respondent

No. 10266

vs.
HOWARD F. CROSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action for the balance due on a conditional
sales contract with a prayer for an order that the conditionally purchased property be sold and that Plaintiff
be given a judgment for the deficiency, if any.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was
denied and the case was tried before a jury who returned
a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court entered
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $941.54,
plus interest at ten per cent from November 1, 1963, for
$155.25 attorneys fees and costs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
a judgment granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 30, 1963, Plaintiff, Golden Spike Equipment
Company, sold Defendant, Howard F. Croshaw, a used
1957 Combine on a conditional sales contract which provided for a cash price of $2500, a time price differential
of $124.61, the balance to be paid in two installments, the
first installment of $941.54 being due November 1, 1963,
and the balance of $983.07 being due November 1, 1964.
The Defendant did not pay the installment due November
1, 1963.
Defendant claimed the combine would not work, that
the parties mutually cancelled the contract and the combine was returned to the Plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. On May 20, 1964, Plaintiff filed a
complaint declaring the entire balance of the contract
due and payable in the amount of $1924.61 together with
interest, attorney's fees and costs and asked that the combine be sold and Plaintiff be given a judgment for the
deficiency if any. The Summons was served on the Defendant on June 15, 1964.
A few days after June 15, 1964, Defendant visited
plaintiff and plaintiff offered to settle the matter if defendant would purchase another combine for $500.00 and
would pay plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of
$300.00. Defendant believing the attorney's fees were
2

excessive under the circumstances chose to answer the
complaint and filed a counterclaim for damages for breach
of warranty.
Defendant moved for a Summary Judgment to dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the contract was
not enforceable under Section 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The Court denied Defendant's motion
and the case was tried before a jury who returned a verdict
for the Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for
Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint as the
filing of a complaint declaring the entire amount of a
conditional sales contract due and payable before maturity
violates the buyer's right under Section 15-l-2a(B) ( 4),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to pay the full indebtedness
of the contract at any time prior to final maturity.
ARGUMENT
THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT DECLARING THE
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF A CONDITIONAL SALES
CONTRACT DUE AND PAYABLE BEFORE MATURITY VIOLATES THE BUYER'S RIGHT UNDER SECTION 15-l-2a (B) (4) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, TO PAY THE FULL INDEBTEDNESS OF THE
CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO FINAL J\,1ATURITY.
This appears to be a case of novel impression. Defendant has been unable to find a statute similar to Sec3

tion 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and therefore
cases from other jurisdictions are inapplicable here. The
Utah Supreme Court in Dusenberry v. Taylor, 7 Utah 2d
383, 325 P2d 910 considered the second paragraph of subdivisiort ··(B) (5) of Section 15-l-2a and said "that the
provision next last quoted seems almost absurd" but held
that the literal reading of the statute was "understandable
and clear" and even though "there appears on the surface
no good reason for enacting such legislation" the Court
said "We cannot say it is void because the legislature
used language leading to almost senseless results." Since
the Supreme Court of Utah has indicated the language of
the statute is clear, no citation to cases interpreting similar
language appear appropriate. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 225-227, p. 204-212. 82 C. J. S., Statutes Sec. 322
( 2), p. 577 et. seq. In Re Stevens Estate, 107 Utah 255
at 259, 130 P2d 85 where the Court said:
"The language of the statute is plain and its meaning is
clear, in which case there is no occasion to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself."
The pertinent part of the stahite provides:
" ( 4) Any provision in any conditional sale contract for the
sale of personal property to the contrary notwithstanding,
the buyer may satisfy in full the indebtedness evidenced
by such contract at any time before the final maturity
thereof."
" ( 5) If the seller ... shall violate any provision of subdivisions ( 3) ·. or ( 4) of this subsection the conditional
contra~t shall not be enforceable."
4

Defendant submits that when upon filing its complaint
on May 20, 1964, Plaintiff declared the entire balance of
the contract due and payable over five months prior to
the final maturity date (see paragraphs 5 and 8 of Plaintiffs complaint) and brought suit for this amount plus
attorney's fees and interest it was a violation of subdivision
( 4) above quoted and therefore the contract is not enforceable as provided in subdivision ( 5). There are only
two actions the Seller can take to violate the quoted
provision of subdivision ( 4) and suffer the penalty set
forth in subdivision ( 5). One is by refusing to accept
an advance payment by the buyer and the other is to
demand the entire unpaid balance before maturity as
Plaintiff did in this instance. (Accidental or bona fide
errors in computation are not subject to the penalty).
Not only is defendant's interpretation required by
the plain language of the statute, but such interpretation
is also reasonable and not absurd as is the portion of the
statute discussed in Dusenberry v. Taylor, supra. In the
first place the entire statute is written favorably to the
seller. The seller may omit to do nearly every one of the
mandatory items required by the statute for the protection
of the buyer and yet the legislature says the contract is
still enforceable (see second paragraph of subdivision
B ( 5) and Dusenberry v. Taylor, supra). The conditional
seller is not a small loan company which requires high
interest rates to stay in business, still the seller is permitted
to charge one per cent time price differential on the unpaid
balance for each month the contract price is unpaid which
permits an interest rate of twenty-five per cent or higher.
This is, as the Court says in the case of Dusenberry v.
5

Taylor, supra., "one of the highest (interest rates) found
in our statutes." The Seller may also sue for delinquent
installments and recover collection costs, attorney's fees
and interest on such delinquent installments. Since nearly
everything in the Statute is for the benefit of the seller,
and since in subsection A( 8) the legislature indicates the
statute was written for the benefit of the buyer, it seems
some provision in the statute should be for the buyer's
benefit. Especially since the title of the statute says it
is to provide "for the maximum rates to be charged" which
from the buyer's point of view includes not only the interest rate, but collection costs and attorney's fees as well.
Defendant submits that the provision the legislature
included for the benefit of the buyer is that the seller may
not exercise an accelerated maturity clause in conditional
sales contracts as the Plaintiff did in this case. In other
words, the Seller can only bring suit for delinquent installments, and consequently cannot bring suit for the entire
purchase price until after the final maturity date of the
contract on conditional sales contracts under $7500 covered by this statute.
Such interpretation is reasonable because it protects
the buyer from unreasonable action by the Seller. For
example we may assume a conditional sales contract for
an used automobile. The selling price is $1500, the
buyer pays $300 down and agrees to pay the balance in
12 equal monthly installments. The Seller charges the
maximum time price differential of $144 and makes a
contract for 12 monthly payments of $112 each. The car
does not operate properly so the buyer becomes irritated
6

and even though he is able to pay he does not pay the
first installment. In absence of the statute as interpreted
by the Defendant here the seller could immediately declare the entire balance of $1344 due and payable without
asking the buyer about his problem and the seller could
bring action for the $1344 plus attorneys fees of $201 or
$1545. The seller obtains judgment and attaches the car.
Assume the seller is again able to sell the car for $1500
the buyer has paid the $300 down payment, plus the
judgment of $1545 less the $1500 obtained on resale, or
$345 for the privilege of using the car for one month.
And if the Seller on the Sheriff's sale does not get the
$1500 originally paid by the buyer, but gets only $1000
then the buyer has paid $845 for the privilege of using
the car one month, or over half the price of the automobile in the first place. (To state it differently, the
buyer is paying interest at a rate of from 45% to 545%).
In order to guard against such unconscionable contracts,
the legislature has wisely prohibited the enforcement of
clauses accelerating the maturity of conditional sales contracts.
Does such an interpretation work a hardship on the
Seller. The Seller may still bring suit for delinquent installments and may still recover his collection costs, attorney's fees and interest on delinquent installments. The
legislature specifically reserved these rights in Section
( 4) and the exclusion of any language which states that
the seller may still use the accelerated maturity clause
also indicates the legislature wished to delete this remedy.
See 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 429, p. 450. Or the seller
can exercise his rights under the usual conditional sales
7

contract provlSlons and repossess the property because
of delinquency in payments. The seller now has his down
payment and he has his property back. If the property
has decreased in value to such an extent that he cannot
recover his loss upon a resale of the property. he can still
bring his action against the buyer for the contract price
upon completion of the contract period. But if the property is in a merchantable condition he can resell the property and after the final maturity of the contract the seller
can bring an action for any difference between the balance due and the sale price of the property and obtain a
deficiency judgment. But in all these remedies the buyer
is protected against paying unreasonable interest costs and
attorney's fees where he has defaulted.
Defendant's interpretation of the statute does equity
under Defendant's understanding of the fact situation at
issue (which is only cited as an example since Judgment
was for plaintiff in the District Court). Here the Defendant returned the combine and thought the contract had
been cancelled with the Plaintiff retaining the combine
plus the down payment. Suddenly without prior warning
and without a demand for the delinquent installment and
before the final maturity date of the contract the defendant is served with summons demanding the entire contract balance plus $300 in attorney's fees and interest.
The Defendant made an attempt in June 1964 to
settle the entire matter without suit. The parties reached
a settlement except they were unable to agree on the
amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The plaintiff's attorney asked for the full amount to which she was entitled if the entire balance of the contract was due or as
8

provided in the contract 15 per cent of $1924 rounded to
$300. If Plaintiff had not violated the provision of Section
15-l-2a(B) (4) which permits the buyer to pay the balance at any time before final maturity and had only
brought suit for the first installment of $941.54, the attorney's fees would have been limited to $142.00 under
the provisions of the contract. This may have been a
figure which the defendant would have accepted since his
actions indicated he needed a combine to perform work
for the 1964 season.
The action of the District Court in denying the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment and permitting
trial on the first installment before the final maturity
date of the contract does not change the fact that plaintiff violated the provisions of Section 15-l-2a ( B) ( 4) in
demanding the entire balance before the final maturity
of the contract. Plaintiff's action was ill-advised and it
must now accept the penalty provided by the legislature
in subdivision ( 5) which makes the contract unenforceable and requires the Plaintiff to be content with the
return of the combine and the retention of the down payment.
To hold that the seller may before maturity declare
the entire amount of the contract due and then claim
there is no violation of subdivision ( 4) because the
buyer can always hire an attorney and have the seller's
complaint reduced by the court to the amount then owing
seems to thwart the intent of the legislature. The legislature gave a right to all buyers under conditional sales
contracts to pay the entire amount at any time before
final maturity. If a seller can violate this right by declar9

ing the entire balance due without penalty, sellers mav
take the risk that the buyer in temporary financial difficulty will be unable to hire an attorney to contest the
seller's violation of the buyer's right. The majority of
buyers may conclude the seller had the right under the
acceleration clause in the conditional sales contract and
will allow judgment by default to be taken in the hope
they can eventually work themselves out of the difficulty
of not only paying an extremely high interest rate but
attorney's fees and collection costs as well. Or the buyer
may proceed in ignorance of the law and settle the matter
not knowing the entire balance is not due and the attorney's fees allowable may not be so high.
But if this Court will enforce the legislative intent
and will permit the seller who violates the law by declaring the entire balance due before maturity to be penalized
by refusing to enforce the contract, then the legislative
purpose of fixing maximum rates to be charged on conditional sales contracts will be served. The seller can still
bring action for delinquent installments and obtain recovery of collection costs and attorney's fees thereon, but
the buyer will have the additional time to work out his
problems he contracted for in agreeing to pay the high
interest rate, without also being required to pay the additional interest costs, collection costs and attorney's fees
on installments not yet due which may make the goal of
eventually paying one's debts seem hopeless and unattainable.
CONCLUSION
This Court should not permit the seller who violates
the law by declaring the entire contract balance due be10

fore final maturity to escape the penalty provided by the
legislature in Section 15-l-2a(B) (5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
L. Tom Perry
Ted S. Perry
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Howard F. Croshaw
106 Church St.
Logan, Utah
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